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Abstract—The impressive performance of deep neural networks (DNNs) has immensely strengthened the line of research that aims at
theoretically analyzing their effectiveness. This has incited research on the reaction of DNNs to noisy input, namely developing
adversarial input attacks and strategies that lead to robust DNNs to these attacks. To that end, in this paper, we derive exact analytic
expressions for the first and second moments (mean and variance) of a small piecewise linear (PL) network (Affine, ReLU, Affine)
subject to Gaussian input. In particular, we generalize the second-moment expression of [1] to arbitrary input Gaussian distributions,
dropping the zero-mean assumption. We show that the new variance expression can be efficiently approximated leading to much
tighter variance estimates as compared to the preliminary results of Bibi et al. [1]. Moreover, we experimentally show that these
expressions are tight under simple linearizations of deeper PL-DNNs, where we investigate the effect of the linearization sensitivity on
the accuracy of the moment estimates. Lastly, we show that the derived expressions can be used to construct sparse and smooth
Gaussian adversarial attacks (targeted and non-targeted) that tend to lead to perceptually feasible input attacks.
Index Terms—network moments, price’s theorem, network linearization, probabilistic analysis, gaussian noise, adversarial attacks.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
D EEP neural networks (DNNs) have revolutionized notonly the computer vision and machine learning com-
munities but several other fields throughout science and
engineering such as natural language processing, bioin-
formatics and medicine [2]. While major advances in the
areas of object classification [3], and speech recognition [4]
to name a few, have been attributed to DNNs, a rigor-
ous theoretical understanding of their effectiveness remains
elusive. For instance, while DNNs have shown impressive
performance on visual recognition tasks, they still exhibit
uncouth behaviour when they are subject to carefully tai-
lored inputs [5]. Many prior works show that it is rather
easy, through simple routines, to craft imperceptible input
perturbations, referred to as adversarial attacks. Such at-
tacks can result in a drastic negative effect on the classifi-
cation performance of many popular deep models [5,6,7].
Even more surprisingly, one can design such adversarial
perturbations to be agnostic to both the input image and the
network architecture [8], which are referred to as universal
perturbations. Unfortunately, less progress has been made
towards systematically addressing and understanding this
challenge. One of the early and naive approaches towards
addressing this nuisance is simply through augmenting the
training dataset with data corrupted with adversaries. While
this has been shown to improve network robustness against
such adversaries [6,7], unfortunately, this is a vacuous brute
force approach that does not provide insights on the reasons
behind such behaviour. Moreover, it does not scale for
large dimensional inputs, as the amount of corresponding
augmentation has to necessarily be prohibitively large to
§. Equal contribution
Fig. 1. Two-stage linearization of an arbitrarily deep network. Any
PL-DNN can be linearized before and after a given ReLU through a two-
stage linearization truncating it into a (Affine, ReLU, Affine) network,
whose 1st and 2nd moments can be derived analytically when it is
exposed to Gaussian input noise. We show that these moments are
helpful in predicting how PL-DNNs react to noise and in constructing
adversarial Gaussian input attacks.
capture the variation in input space. This effectively deems
the augmentation approach infeasible in large dimensions.
In this paper, we derive expressions for the first and
second moments (the mean and consequently the variance),
referred to as Network Moments, of a small piecewise linear
(PL) network in the form of (Affine, ReLU, Affine) subject
to a general Gaussian input. The preliminary version of
these Network Moments were derived and analyzed in [1].
Beyond these preliminary results, we derive in this paper a
new variance expression, which does not claim any assump-
tions on the mean or the covariance of the input Gaussian.
This generalizes the previous result in [1], which only holds
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2under a zero mean input assumption. These expressions
provide a powerful tool for analyzing deeper PL-DNNs by
means of two-stage linearization (as shown in Figure 1)
with a plethora of applications. For instance, it has been
shown that such expressions can be quite useful in training
robust networks very efficiently [9], avoiding any need for
noisy data augmentation. In particular, empirical evidence
in [9] indicates that simple regularizers based on the mean
and variance expressions can boost network robustness by
two orders of magnitude not only against Gaussian attacks
but also against other popular adversarial attacks (e.g. PGD,
LBFGS [5], FGSM [6] and DF2 [7]). In this paper, we show
that network moments can be used to systematically de-
sign Gaussian distributions that can serve as input adver-
saries. In particular, we conduct several experiments on
MNIST [10] and Facial Emotion Recognition datasets [11]
to demonstrate that these expressions can be used to craft
sparse and smooth Gaussian attacks that are structured and
perceptually feasible, i.e. they exhibit interesting semantic
information aligned with human perception.
Contributions. (i) We provide a fresh perspective on ana-
lyzing PL-DNNs by deriving closed form expressions for
the output mean and variance of a network in the form
(Affine, ReLU, Affine) in the presence of general Gaussian
input noise. In particular, we generalize the results of [1]
and derive a closed form expression for the second moment
under no assumptions on the mean nor covariance of the
input Gaussian. Through network linearization, extensive
experiments show that the new expression for the output
variance can be efficiently approximated leading to much
tighter second-moment estimates than that of [1]. (ii) We
formalize a new objective as a function of the derived output
mean and variance to construct sparse and smooth Gaussian
adversarial attacks. We conduct extensive experiments on
both MNIST and Facial Emotion datasets demonstrating
that the constructed adversaries are perceptually feasible.
2 RELATED WORK
Despite the impressive performance of deep neural net-
works on visual recognition tasks, their performance can
still be drastically obstructed in the presence of small im-
perceptible adversarial noise [5,6,7]. Alarmingly, such ad-
versaries are abundant and easy to construct, where in
some scenarios constructing an adversary is as simple as
performing a single gradient ascent step of some loss func-
tion with respect to the input [5]. More surprisingly, there
exist deterministic input samples that are agnostic of both
the input and network architecture that can cause severe
reduction in the network performance [8]. Moreover, in
some extreme cases, it can be sufficient to perturb a single
input pixel that can result in a misclassification rate as high
as 70% on popular benchmarks [12].
This nuisance is serious and menacing and has to be
addressed, particularly since DNNs are now deployed in
sensitive real-world applications (e.g. self driving cars).
Thereafter, there have been several directions towards un-
derstanding and circumventing this. Early works aimed at
analyzing the behaviour of DNNs in the general presence of
input noise. For instance, Fawzi et al. [13] proposed a generic
probabilistic framework for analyzing the robustness of a
classifier under different nuisance factors. Another seminal
work particularly assessed the robustness of a classifier
undergoing geometric transformations [14]. On the other
hand, there has been several other works on the design
and training of networks that are robust against adversarial
attacks. One of the earliest approaches on this was the
direct augmentation of adversarial samples to the training
data, which has been shown to indeed lead to more robust
networks [6,7]. Later, the work of [15] adopted a similar
strategy but by incorporating the adversarial augmentation
during the iterative training process. In particular, it was
shown that one can achieve significant boosts in network
robustness against first-order adversarial attacks, i.e. attacks
that depend only on gradient information, by minimizing
the worst adversarial loss over all bounded energy (often
measured in `∞ norm) perturbations around a given input.
Since then, there has been a surge in literature studying
verification approaches for DNNs. In this line of work, the
aim is to design networks that are accurate and provably
robust against all bounded input attacks. In general, veri-
fication approaches can be coarsely categorized as exact or
relaxed verifiers. The former try to find the exact largest
adversarial loss over all possible bounded inputs. Such
verifiers often require piecewise linear networks and rely on
either Mixed Integer Solvers (MIS) [16,17] or on Satisfiability
Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers [18,19]. These verifiers are
too expensive for DNNs due to their NP-complete nature.
Relaxed verifiers on the other hand scale better, since they
only find an upper bound to the worst adversarial loss
[20,21]. There has been several new directions that aim at ad-
dressing the verification problem by constructing networks
with smoothed decision boundaries [22,23].
In this paper, we are not concerned with such techniques
but only focus on analyzing the behaviour of networks in
the presence of input noise. We focus our analysis on PL-
DNNs with ReLU activations. Unlike previous work, we
study how the probabilistic moments of the output of a PL-
DNN with a Gaussian input can be computed analytically.
A similar work to ours is [24], where the probabilistic output
mean and variance of a deep network are estimated by
propagating the estimates of the moments per layer under
the assumption that the joint distribution after each affine
layer is still Gaussian (through the central limit theorem).
On the contrary, we derive the exact first and second mo-
ments of a simple two-layer (Affine, ReLU, Affine) network.
We extrapolate these expressions to deeper PL-DNNs by
employing a simple two-stage linearization step that locally
approximates them with a (Affine, ReLU, Affine) network.
Since these expressions are a function of the noise parame-
ters, they are particularly useful in analyzing and inferring
the behaviour of the original PL-DNN without having to
probe the network with inputs sampled from the noise
distribution as regularly done in previous work [6,7].
3 NETWORK MOMENTS§
We start by analyzing a particularly shaped network in the
form of (Affine, ReLU, Affine) in the presence of Gaussian
input noise. The functional form of the network of interest is
§. All proofs are omitted for the Appendix.
3given as g(x) = Bmax (Ax+ c1,0p) + c2, where max(.) is
an element wise operator. The affine mappings can be of any
size, and we assume throughout the paper that A ∈ Rp×n
and B ∈ Rd×p, where d is the number of output logits. Note
that A and B can be of any structure (circular or Toeplitz)
generalizing both fully connected and convolutional layers.
In this section, we analyze g when x is a Gaussian
random vector, i.e. x ∼ N (µx,Σx). Seeking the probability
density function (PDF) through the nonlinear random vari-
able mapping g is possible for when B = I but much more
difficult for arbitraryB in general. Thus, we instead focus on
deriving the probabilistic moments of the unknown distribu-
tion of g(x). For ease of notation, we denote gi(.) as the ith
function in g(.), i.e. gi(x) =B(i, :)max(Ax+c1,0p)+c2(i).
At first, and for completeness, we present the results of
our preliminary work [1], where the first moment (mean)
expression is derived for a general Gaussian input distri-
bution, while the second moment is derived under a zero
input mean assumption, i.e. µx = 0n with c1 = 0. We
then derive and generalize the expression for the second
moment of g(x) for a generic Gaussian distribution under
no assumptions in Lemma 4.
3.1 Deriving the 1st Output Moment: E[g(x)]
To derive the first moment of g(x), we first consider the
scalar function q(x) = max(x, 0) acting on a single Gaussian
random variable x.
Remark 1. The PDF of q(x) = max(x, 0) : R → R where
x ∼ N (µx, σ2x) is:
fq(x) = Q
(
µx
σx
)
δ(x) + fx(x)u(x)
whereQ(.) is the Gaussian Q-function, δ(x) is the dirac function,
fx(x) is the Gaussian PDF, and u(.) is the unit step function. It
follows directly that E[q(x)] = σx√
2pi
when µx = 0.
Now, we present the first moment of g(x).
Theorem 1. For any function in the form of g(x) where x ∼
N (µx,Σx), we have:
E[gi(x)] =
p∑
v=1
B(i, v)
(
1
2
µ¯v − 1
2
µ¯verf
( −µ¯v√
2σ¯v
)
+
1√
2pi
σ¯v exp
(
− µ¯
2
v
2σ¯2v
))
+ c2(i)
where µ¯v = (Aµx + c1) (v), Σ¯ = AΣxA>, σ¯2v = Σ¯(v, v) and
erf (x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0 e
−t2dt is the error function.
3.2 Deriving the 2nd Output Moment: E[g2(x)]
Here, we need three pre-requisite lemmas: one that char-
acterizes the PDF of a squared ReLU (Lemma 1), another
that extends Price’s Theorem [25] (Lemma 2), and one
that derives the first moment of the product of two ReLU
functions (Lemma 3).
Lemma 1. The PDF of q2(x) = max2(x, 0) : R → R where
x ∼ N (0, σ2x) is :
fq2(x) =
1
2
δ(x) +
1
2
√
x
fx(
√
x)u(
√
x)
and its first moment is E[q2(x)] = σ
2
x
2 .
Lemma 2. Let x ∈ Rn ∼ N (µx,Σx) for any even p, where
σij = Σx(i, j) ∀i 6= j. Under mild assumptions on the nonlin-
ear map Ψ : Rn → R, we have ∂
p
2 E[Ψ(x)]∏
∀oddi ∂σii+1
= E[ ∂
pΨ(x)
∂x1...∂xp
].
Lemma (2) relates the mean of the gradients/subgradients
of any nonlinear function to the gradients/subgradients of
the mean of that function. This lemma has Price’s theorem
[25] as a special case when the function Ψ(x) has the struc-
ture Ψ(x) =
∏n
i Ψi(xn) with Σ(i, i) = 1 ∀i. It is worthwhile
to note that there is an extension to Price’s theorem [26],
where the assumptions σ2ii = 1 ∀i and Ψ(x) =
∏n
i Ψi(xi)
are dropped; however, it only holds for the bivariate case,
i.e. n = 2, and thus is also a special case of Lemma (2).
Lemma 3. For any bivariate Gaussian random variable x =
[x1, x2]
> ∼ N (02,Σx), the following holds for T (x1, x2) =
max(x1, 0) max(x2, 0):
E[T (x1, x2)] =
1
2pi
(
σ12 sin
−1
(
σ12
σ1σ2
)
+ σ1σ2
√
1− σ
2
12
σ21σ
2
2
)
+
σ12
4
where σij = Σx(i, j) ∀i 6= j and σ2i = Σx(i, i).
Theorem 2. For any function in the form of g(x) where x ∼
N (0n,Σx) and that c1 = 0p then:
E[g2i (x)] =
2
k∑
v1
v1−1∑
v2
B(i, v1)B(i, v2)
(
σ¯v1v2
2pi
sin−1
(
σ¯v1v2
σ¯v1 σ¯v2
)
+
σ¯v1 σ¯v2
2pi
√
1− σ¯
2
v1v2
σ¯2v1 σ¯
2
v2
+
σ¯v1v2
4
)
+
1
2
k∑
r
B(i, r)2σ¯2r + c2(i)
Lastly, the variance of g(x) can be directly derived:
var(gi(x)) = E[g2i (x)]−E[gi(x)]2|µx=0¯k . While the previous
expression assumes a zero-mean Gaussian input and bias-
free first layer, i.e. c1 = 0, we extend these results next to
arbitrary Gaussian distributions without assumptions on c1.
The key element here is to extend the result of Lemma 3.
Lemma 4. For any bivariate Gaussian x ∼ N (µx,Σx), where
µx = [µ1, µ2]
> and Σ =
[
σ21 ρσ1σ2
ρσ1σ2 σ
2
2
]
, then we have that
E[max(x1, 0) max(x2, 0)] = Ω(µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2, ρ)
+

µ1µ2+ρσ1σ2
pi
(
Ia1,b1 (∞)− Ia1,b1
(
−µ2√
2σ2
))
,
for |ρ| < 1√
2
,
µ1µ2+ρσ1σ2
pi
[
pi
4 sign(ρ) +
pi
4 erf(
e>1 Σ˜µx√
2
)erf( µ2√
2σ2
)
−sign(ρ)
(
Ia2,b2 (∞)− Ia2,b2
(
sign(ρ)e
>
1 Σ˜µx√
2
))]
,
for |ρ| > 1√
2
.
(1)
4where
Ω =
√|Σ|
2pi
exp
(
−1
2
µ>x Σ
−1µx
)
+
µ1σ2
2
√
2pi
exp
(−µ22
2σ22
)
(
1 + erf
(
e>1 Σ˜µx√
2
))
+
µ2σ1
2
√
2pi
exp
(−µ21
2σ21
)
(
1 + erf
(
e>2 Σ˜µx√
2
))
+
µ1µ2 + ρσ1σ2
4
(
1 + erf
(
µ2√
2σ2
))
,
(2)
and where
Ia,b(x) =
pi
4
erf(x)erf(b) +
√
pi
2
exp(−b2)
∞∑
u=0
{
(a/2)2u+1
Γ(u+ 3/2)
P (u+ 1, x2)H2u(b)
− sign(x)(a/2)
2u+2
Γ(u+ 2)
P (u+ 3/2, x2)H2u+1(b)
}
.
(3)
Note that e1 and e2 are the two dimensional canonical
vectors. Moreover, note that Σ˜ = Diag([
√
|Σ|/σ2,
√
|Σ|/σ1])Σ−1
where Diag(v) rearranges the elements of the vector v into a
diagonal matrix and |Σ| denotes the matrix determinant. The con-
stants a1, b1, a2, and b2 are ρ/
√
1−ρ2, µ1σ2/
√
2|Σ|,
√
1−ρ2/|ρ| and
−µ1/√2ρσ1, respectively. Lastly, H(.) is the Hermite polynomial,
P (., .) is the normalized incomplete Gamma function and Γ(.) is
the standard Gamma function.
Proof. This is a sketch of the proof.
I0 = E[max(x1, 0) max(x2, 0)]
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
x1x2fX1,X2(x1, x2)dx1dx2
=
∫ ∞
0
x2fX2(x2)
∫ ∞
0
x1fX1|X2(x1|x2)dx1dx2
=
1
σ2
∫ ∞
0
x2fX2(x2)
[√|Σ|
2pi
exp
(
r2(x2)
2|Σ|
)
+ r(x2)Φ
(
r(x2)√|Σ|
)]
dx2,
(4)
where r(x2) = µ1σ2 + ρσ1(x2 − µ2). The functions fX1,X2 ,
fX1|X2 and fX2 are the joint bivariate, conditional and
marginal Gaussian distributions. By integration by parts,
Leibniz’s rule, some identities and substitutions, Equation
(4) reduces to:
I0 = Ω(µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2, ρ)
+
µ1µ2 + ρσ1σ2
2
√
pi
∫ ∞
−µ2√
2σ2
exp(−z2)erf
(
ρz + µ1/
√
2σ1√
(1− ρ2)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸∫∞
κ φ(z)dz
dz,
(5)
where Ω(µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2, ρ) is given by Equation (2). As for
the remaining integral, we exploit identities (2.1) and (2.2)
in [27], which states that Ia,b(x) =
√
pi
2
∫ x
0 exp(−t2)erf(at +
b)dt has a closed form solution given in Equation (3).
Thus, one can represent the integral in Equation (5) as√
pi
2
∫∞
κ φ(z)dz = Ia,b(∞) − Ia,b(κ) where a = ρ/
√
1− ρ2,
b = µ1/(
√
2σ1
√
1− ρ2) and κ = −µ2/
√
2σ2. Now note
that the infinite series corresponding to Ia,b(x) and Ia,b(∞)
in Equation (3) converges when |a| < 1 or equivalently
|ρ| < 1/√2 which proves the first case in Equation (1).
As for the case |ρ| > 1/√2, by integrating the integral in
Equation (5) by parts, we have
√
pi
2
∫ ∞
κ
exp(−t2)erf(at+ b)dt = −pi
4
erf (aκ+ b) erf(κ)
+ sign(a)
(pi
4
− I1/|a|,−b/a(∞) + I1/|a|,−b/a ((aκ+ b) sign(a))
)
.
(6)
Note that the series from the identity replacing I1/|a|,−b/a
converges when |a| > 1 or equivalently |ρ| > 1/√2. Thus,
substituting this result back in Equation (5) derives the
second case of Equation (1) and completing the proof.
Following Theorem 2, a closed form expression for E[g2i (x)]
under generic Gaussian distributions can be derived by
substituting the result from Lemma 4 (in lieu of Lemma 3)
in the proof of Theorem 2 deriving an expression for the
variance of gi(x). Moreover, we show in the Appendix that
Equation (1) recovers Lemma 3 for when µ1 = µ2 = 0.
3.3 Extension to Deeper PL-DNNs
To extend the previous results to deeper DNNs that are not
in the form (Affine, ReLU, Affine), we first denote the larger
DNN as R(x) : Rn → Rd (e.g. a mapping of the input to the
logits of d classes). By choosing the lth ReLU layer, any R(.)
can be decomposed into: R(x) = Rl+1 (ReLUl (Rl−1 (x))).
In this paper, we employ a simple two-stage linearization
based on Taylor series approximation to cast R(.) into the
form (Affine, ReLU, Affine). For example, we can linearize
it around points x and y = ReLUl (Rl−1(x)), such that
Rl−1(x) ≈ Ax+ c1 and Rl+1(y) ≈ By+ c2. The resulting
function after linearization is R(x) ≈ BReLUl (Ax+ c1) +
c2. Figure 1 shows this two-stage linearization. Details in
regards to the selection of the layer of linearization l and the
points of linearization are discussed thoroughly next.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we discuss a variety of experiments to pro-
vide the following insights. (i) Although the derived output
variance of the Affine-ReLU-Affine network based on Equa-
tion (1) is impractical, the infinite sum can be accurately
approximated with as few as 20 terms leading to an efficient
computation. (ii) We conduct several controlled experiments
to investigate the choice of the linearization layer l, at which
two-stage linearization is performed. We also validate the
tightness of both the first and second moment expressions
for deeper networks under different linearization points, as
well as, showing that the new derived variance based on
Lemma 4 is much tighter than the one based on Lemma 3 for
general input Gaussian distributions. (iii) Lastly, extensive
experiments on MNIST and Emotion datasets validate that
our derived expressions can be used to construct targeted
and non-targeted adversarial Gaussian attacks. In particular,
and following the recent successes of sparse pixel attacks
[28], we demonstrate that our expressions can indeed be uti-
lized to design sparse and smooth Gaussian perturbations
leading to perceptually feasible input attacks.
5Fig. 2. Approximating Equation (1). The maximum absolute error
between the Monte Carlo estimates and the truncated Equation (1) for
different parameterizations of the bivariate Gaussian decreases rapidly
as the number of terms in the truncated sum increases. The two plots
show that the error decreases very quickly and regardless of all the other
parameters, when ρ is not close to the disjunction, i.e. ρ = ±1/√2.
4.1 On the Efficacy of Approximating Equation (1)
Computing the variance of the Affine-ReLU-Affine network,
i.e. g(x), under general Gaussian input x, as per Equation (1)
in Lemma 4, requires the evaluation of Equation (3), which
is impractical as it involves an infinite series. We show
here that the series can be sufficiently well approximated
with as few as 20 terms. To demonstrate this along with
the sensitivity of Equation (1) to µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2 and ρ,
we report the maximum absolute error between the Monte
Carlo estimates of E[max(x1, 0) max(x2, 0)] and truncated
versions of the sum in Equation (1) with 1, 5, 10, 20, and 50
terms over a grid of all combinations of the five arguments.
In particular, µ1 and µ2 are sampled uniformly from the grid
[−2, 2], σ1 and σ2 are on the uniform grid [0.2, 2], and lastly
ρ is sampled uniformly from the grid [−0.7, 0.7], where all
parameters are sampled with 0.2 spacing. In addition, we
also include ρ = 0 and ρ = 0.999. Figure 2 reports the
maximum absolute error of all possible combinations of the
aforementioned parameters in log-scale with an increasing
number of terms of Equation (3). We observe from Figure 2
that, with as few as 20 terms, the maximum absolute error be-
tween the Monte Carlo estimates and the truncated version
of Equation (1) is 10−2.5 ≈ 0.003. This occurs regardless of
the choice of µ1, µ2, σ1 and σ2 and particularly when ρ is
close to ±1/√2 ≈ ±0.7, which is the disjunction in Equation
(1). Recall that the disjunction occurs at these values of ρ,
since the infinite series diverges in such cases. On the other
hand, the maximum absolute error decreases rapidly so long
as ρ is away from ±1/√2. Now that Equation (1) can reliably
and efficiently be approximated with a small number of
terms, deeming it efficient, the closed form expression of
Equation (1) can be used to compute the output variance
of g(x) for various applications. Throughout all remaining
experiments, we will use only 5 terms, since the absolute
error is of order ≈ 10−4 for all choices of µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2, ρ
except for the improbable two singularities ρ ∈ {±1/√2}.
TABLE 1
Varying the layer of linearization l. The average approximation error,
on a randomly sampled MNIST image corrupted with additive Gaussian
noise, between LeNet and the two stage-linearized version increases
as the layer of linearization l increases.
Noise ± 0.5 ± 0.75 ± 1 ± 1.5 ± 2
l = 1 0.0241 0.0362 0.0485 0.0730 0.0977
l = 2 0.0330 0.0497 0.0663 0.0996 0.1330
l = 3 0.0329 0.0495 0.0661 0.0993 0.1327
4.2 Tightness of Network Moments
Choice of the Two-Stage Linearization Layer l. The derived
expressions for the first and second moments are for a small
network in the form Affine-ReLU-Affine. As detailed in
Subsection 3.3, such results can be extended and applied to
deeper networks through the proposed two-stage lineariza-
tion. However, it is not clear how to choose the layer of
linearization l. This subsection addresses this design choice
by conducting an ablation to study the impact of varying
l. In particular, we show that there is an intrinsic trade off
between memory efficiency and linearization error for the
choice of the layer l, around which two-stage linearization is
performed. To illustrate this, consider the following network
R(x) = Rl+1 (ReLU(Rl−1(x))) where R(.) : Rn → Rd,
Rl−1(.) : Rn → Rq , and Rl+1 : Rq → Rd. Perform-
ing two-stage linearization requires the memory of storing
the Jacobians of the two-stage linearization ∇Rl−1(.) and
∇Rl+1(.), which is a total of 2q + n + d elements. When
l is chosen to be small (early convolutional layers), the
value q is usually very large, as it is the total number of
pixels across all feature maps. Meanwhile, when l is large, q
is usually only the number of nodes in a fully connected
layer. However, the choice of large l in general leads to
larger linearization error. To demonstrate this, we conduct
experiments on the LeNet architecture [29] pretrained on
the MNIST digit dataset [10]. Note that LeNet has a total
of four layers, two of which are convolutional with max
pooling and the other two are fully connected. We perform
two-stage linearization on LeNet with a varying choice of l,
where we compare the `2 difference between the prediction
scores of LeNet and the two-stage linearized version with
the point of linearization taken to be a noisy version of
a random image from the MNIST validation set. Table 1
demonstrates that the choice of smaller l is best, in `2 sense,
for the two-stage linearization across all the various levels of
noisy versions of the input. This implies a trade off between
memory efficiency (better memory complexity with larger
l) and accuracy (better `2 linearization error for smaller l).
Therefore and due to memory constraints, l is chosen to be
the fully-connected layer just before the last ReLU activation
in all experiments, unless stated otherwise.
Tightness of Moment Expressions on LeNet. It is con-
ceivable that the two-stage linearization might impact the
tightness of the derived moment expressions when ap-
plied to deeper real PL-DNNs. Here, we empirically study
their tightness by comparing them against Monte Carlo
estimates over 104 samples on LeNet. Using the MNIST
dataset, the input to the network is R28×28 with 10 output
classes (i.e. d = 10). In this case, following Section 3.3, the
6two-stage linearization is performed such that µx = M,
y = Rl−1(x) and l = 3 for memory efficiency, where M
is an image selected from the MNIST testing set. Thus,
the input is x ∼ N (M,Σ) where we randomly generate
a covariance matrix such that trace(Σ) = σ2(28 × 28)
with reasonable noise levels σ ∈ {0.001, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1}
when M ∈ [0, 1]28×28. Since the LeNet architecture has
d = 10, we report the tightness of the analytic mean from
Theorem 1, variance from Theorem 2, and the new general
variance expression based on Lemma 4 for gi(x) ∀i. As for
the metric, we report the average absolute relative difference
Er(x, y) =
2|x−y|
|x|+|y| of the analytic mean and variance expres-
sions (Theorems 1 and 2) to their Monte Carlo counterparts.
We refer to each as E[Eerror] = E [Er(E[gi(x)],EMC)] and
E[varerror] = E [Er(var(gi(x)), varMC)], respectively. Sim-
ilarly, we refer to the error of the Monte Carlo estimates
to the new variance expression based on Lemma 4 as
E[varnewerror], where we find that the summation in Equation
(3) can be truncated to only 5 terms without scarifying
much accuracy. We average the results over the complete
MNIST test set. We report the tightness results across all
classes in Table 2, where the closer the errors are to 0 the
better. For instance, at σ = 0.05, the absolute relative difference
for the mean expression of Theorem 1 are close to 0.1, i.e.
E[Eerror] ≈ 0.11. That is to say, the mean expression is tight
even though two-stage linearization is being performed on a
real network. Whereas, the variance expression of Theorem
2 is less accurate, E[varerror] ≈ 0.19, and this can be
attributed to the assumptions that do not hold (zero-mean
input Gaussian and c1 = 0). On the other hand, the new
general expression for the output variance based on Lemma
4 is significantly much tighter than the one from Theorem 2,
as the errors compared to the Monte Carlo estimates are
closer to 0, i.e. E[varnewerror] ≈ 0.07. This shows that our
new variance expression is far tighter and less sensitive to
two-stage linearization despite the truncation of the infinite
series to as few as 5 terms. Furthermore, complementing the
results in Table 2 and instead of reporting the absolute relative
difference alone, we visualize the histogram of LeNet output
variances for all testing MNIST images under varying noise
levels in Table 3 for better interpretability of the results.
Sensitivity to the Point of Linearization. In all previous
tightness validation experiments of the moment expres-
sions, the point at which two-stage linearization is per-
formed was restricted to be the input image, i.e. M. Clearly,
this strategy suffers from limited scalability, since analyzing
the output moment expressions of deep networks over a
large dataset requires performing the expensive two-stage
linearization for every image in the dataset. To circumvent
this difficulty, we study the sensitivity of the tightness of
the expressions under two-stage linearization around only
a small set of input images from the dataset. That is to say,
we choose a set of representative input images, at which
the two-stage linearization parameters A,B, c1 and c2 are
computed only once and offline for each input image. Now,
to evaluate the network moments for an unseen input, we
simply use the two-stage linearization parameters of the
closest linearization point to this input.
In this experiment, we study the tightness of our expres-
sions under this more relaxed linearization strategy using
TABLE 2
Tightness results across all classes on MNIST. Using different
values of input noise σ, the table shows that the mean expression of
Theorem 1 is tight and insensitive under two-stage linearization.
Moreover, the table demonstrates that the new general variance
expression based on Lemma 4 is far tighter, despite the truncation of
the infinite series, compared the previous results from Theorem 2.
σ gi(x) E[Eerror] E[varerror] E[varnewerror]
0.001 0 0.002± 0.029 0.197± 0.126 0.102± 0.070
1 0.001± 0.011 0.195± 0.148 0.065± 0.051
2 0.002± 0.024 0.178± 0.127 0.063± 0.051
3 0.004± 0.038 0.255± 0.190 0.146± 0.118
4 0.002± 0.019 0.192± 0.143 0.131± 0.100
5 0.002± 0.022 0.157± 0.115 0.075± 0.067
6 0.002± 0.024 0.248± 0.161 0.137± 0.088
7 0.002± 0.034 0.225± 0.157 0.120± 0.101
8 0.005± 0.036 0.173± 0.122 0.103± 0.082
9 0.003± 0.030 0.182± 0.132 0.057± 0.057
Avg 0.003± 0.027 0.200± 0.142 0.100± 0.078
0.010 0 0.021± 0.098 0.202± 0.127 0.026± 0.021
1 0.014± 0.067 0.197± 0.150 0.022± 0.017
2 0.023± 0.104 0.176± 0.126 0.029± 0.022
3 0.034± 0.138 0.252± 0.190 0.024± 0.019
4 0.022± 0.111 0.190± 0.139 0.024± 0.020
5 0.019± 0.099 0.163± 0.117 0.026± 0.020
6 0.017± 0.074 0.255± 0.163 0.024± 0.019
7 0.012± 0.075 0.227± 0.155 0.024± 0.020
8 0.041± 0.149 0.178± 0.125 0.027± 0.022
9 0.025± 0.116 0.186± 0.134 0.024± 0.019
Avg 0.023± 0.103 0.203± 0.143 0.025± 0.020
0.050 0 0.101± 0.212 0.177± 0.118 0.075± 0.051
1 0.083± 0.166 0.189± 0.145 0.059± 0.042
2 0.125± 0.259 0.183± 0.131 0.071± 0.049
3 0.146± 0.320 0.248± 0.179 0.068± 0.049
4 0.111± 0.244 0.186± 0.139 0.059± 0.045
5 0.099± 0.241 0.159± 0.116 0.065± 0.047
6 0.084± 0.159 0.209± 0.148 0.079± 0.051
7 0.061± 0.163 0.225± 0.167 0.076± 0.055
8 0.157± 0.331 0.161± 0.116 0.073± 0.054
9 0.119± 0.260 0.179± 0.131 0.075± 0.049
Avg 0.109± 0.235 0.192± 0.139 0.070± 0.049
0.100 0 0.177± 0.257 0.159± 0.121 0.165± 0.085
1 0.176± 0.223 0.194± 0.150 0.138± 0.073
2 0.265± 0.367 0.209± 0.151 0.139± 0.079
3 0.243± 0.410 0.263± 0.178 0.149± 0.083
4 0.232± 0.344 0.200± 0.155 0.126± 0.078
5 0.189± 0.321 0.165± 0.125 0.131± 0.077
6 0.158± 0.211 0.161± 0.123 0.178± 0.085
7 0.130± 0.225 0.251± 0.197 0.172± 0.091
8 0.251± 0.415 0.161± 0.120 0.163± 0.089
9 0.231± 0.355 0.195± 0.143 0.167± 0.083
Avg 0.205± 0.313 0.196± 0.146 0.153± 0.082
LeNet on the MNIST testing set. We cluster the images in
the testing dataset using k-means on the image intensity
space with different values of k. We use the cluster centers as
the linearization points. Table 4 summarizes the tightness of
the expressions for k ∈ {250, 500, 1000, 2500, 5000, 10000}
and compares them against a weak baseline, where the
linearization point is set to be the farthest image in each
cluster from the cluster center with k ∈ {250, 500}. It is
clear that the new variance expression based on Lemma
4 remains very close to the Monte Carlo estimate across
different number of linearization points k, even when k
is as low as 250, i.e. only 2.5% of the testing set. On the
other hand, the analytic variance derived from Theorem 2
is less accurate but stays within an acceptable range with
E[varerror] ≈ 0.25. This indeed reaffirms that even upon
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LeNet variance histograms on MNIST. The table shows the histogram of LeNet output variances for all testing MNIST images under varying
noise levels. We compare the estimation of output variance through Monte-Carlo sampling of 104 instances against the variance expressions in
Theorem 2 (Old) and Lemma 4 (New). We also report in the legend the averaged absolute relative difference over the images.
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Tightness results under varying number of linearization points k.
The table shows the tightness results using varying number of
linearization points (i.e. k-means cluster centers) averaged over all
testing MNIST classes under different values of input noise σ.
*As for the Baseline experiment, the linearization points are set to be
the farthest instances from the clusters’ centers.
σ k E[Eerror] E[varerror] E[varnewerror]
0.001 250 0.524± 0.594 0.282± 0.207 0.205± 0.170
250* 0.846± 0.688 0.293± 0.220 0.303± 0.238
500 0.474± 0.572 0.269± 0.195 0.194± 0.157
500* 0.766± 0.684 0.277± 0.206 0.276± 0.221
1000 0.414± 0.541 0.260± 0.191 0.185± 0.152
2500 0.315± 0.481 0.241± 0.175 0.165± 0.134
5000 0.194± 0.387 0.224± 0.163 0.140± 0.115
10000 0.003± 0.027 0.200± 0.142 0.100± 0.078
0.010 250 0.525± 0.596 0.291± 0.209 0.210± 0.172
250* 0.859± 0.694 0.284± 0.210 0.287± 0.232
500 0.470± 0.569 0.275± 0.202 0.192± 0.163
500* 0.763± 0.678 0.275± 0.203 0.259± 0.217
1000 0.411± 0.537 0.263± 0.190 0.174± 0.145
2500 0.313± 0.478 0.243± 0.176 0.143± 0.125
5000 0.198± 0.388 0.227± 0.163 0.101± 0.101
10000 0.023± 0.103 0.203± 0.143 0.025± 0.020
0.050 250 0.516± 0.596 0.263± 0.193 0.193± 0.159
250* 0.848± 0.689 0.285± 0.214 0.299± 0.238
500 0.464± 0.572 0.251± 0.184 0.177± 0.149
500* 0.761± 0.678 0.268± 0.202 0.270± 0.220
1000 0.405± 0.538 0.242± 0.181 0.163± 0.142
2500 0.312± 0.475 0.226± 0.166 0.138± 0.120
5000 0.216± 0.388 0.211± 0.155 0.110± 0.098
10000 0.109± 0.235 0.192± 0.139 0.070± 0.049
0.100 250 0.507± 0.591 0.240± 0.183 0.192± 0.162
250* 0.823± 0.688 0.298± 0.220 0.332± 0.250
500 0.463± 0.567 0.234± 0.175 0.185± 0.153
500* 0.751± 0.671 0.290± 0.219 0.315± 0.239
1000 0.412± 0.535 0.226± 0.169 0.177± 0.147
2500 0.337± 0.477 0.218± 0.163 0.165± 0.132
5000 0.268± 0.406 0.208± 0.156 0.158± 0.116
10000 0.205± 0.313 0.196± 0.146 0.153± 0.082
truncating the infinite series in Equation (3) to only 5 terms,
the new variance expression is much tighter and more accu-
rate under network linearization than the preliminary result
of Theorem 2 in [1]. As for the analytic mean, however, it
is more sensitive to the point of linearization but even in
the worst case, i.e. k = 250 and σ = 0.1 for example, the
average error E[Eerror] doesn’t exceed 0.5. When compared
with the baseline experiments, i.e. using the farthest point to
the cluster center, the contrast becomes more obvious where
the error is about 0.8.
4.3 Noise Construction
After establishing the tightness of our expressions com-
pared to Monte Carlo estimates, we show more practical
applications of these expressions, in which the output mean
and variance expressions can be used to construct noise
with certain properties. In particular, we are interested in
showing that samples from a carefully crafted Gaussian
distribution can act as an adversary. This goes against the
common belief that Gaussian noise is too simple for such
a task. In this section, we show insightful results on how
Fig. 3. Targeted attacks. The figure shows noisy images that fool LeNet.
The images from top-left to bottom-right are the original image from
MNIST and the noisy versions classified as 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8, respectively.
to construct targeted and non-targeted Gaussian adversar-
ial attacks. Moreover, we also show that such expressions
can be leveraged to construct sparse and smooth Gaussian
adversarial attacks that are perceptually feasible. It is to be
noted here that this section is concerned about establishing
the fact that Gaussian noise can act as an adversary while
being perceptually feasible and not to particularly achieve
state-of-the-art results on the task of adversarial attacks.
The problem setup is as follows: given an image M, whose
predicted class is i, the task is to add noise x ∼ N (µx,Σx)
to M such that the expected prediction score of the network
of M + x is j 6= i. If such noise exists, we say the network
is fooled in expectation. To keep the optimization and the
number of variables manageable, we only consider the
case of isotropic Gaussian distributions, i.e. Σx = σ2In.
We define EMi (µx, σ2) ≡ E[gi(M + x(µx,σ2In))] to avoid
text clutter. In the following experiments, the two-stage
linearization is performed around M at l = 3 for LeNet
and l = 7 for AlexNet.
Targeted Attacks. On the MNIST dataset, we specify a
target class j and we construct a noise that can fool LeNet
in expectation by solving the following optimization:
arg min
µx,σ
(
max
k 6=j
(
EMk (µx, σ2)
)
− EMj (µx, σ2)
)
s.t. 0 < σ2 ≤ 2, − β1n ≤ µx ≤ β1n.
(7)
Note that for any pair (µx, σ) for which the previous objec-
tive is negative, the largest expected prediction among all
classes occurs at the target class j. In this experiment, we set
β = 30 and solve problem (7) with an interior-point solver.
Note that the range of pixel values of MNIST images is
[−127.5, 127.5]. Figure 3 shows examples of noisy versions
of an image from class 9 that fool LeNet in expectation
with multiple target classes (i.e. j ∈ {2, 3, 4, 7, 8}). Not
every target class is easily targeted with small β because
of the distance in their prediction scores. We verify that the
constructed noise actually fools the network by sampling 10
samples from the learned distribution, passing each noisy
input through LeNet, and verifying that at least 90% of the
predicted class flips are from 9 to the target class j.
9Fig. 4. Non-targeted attacks with α%-pixel support on MNIST. The
noisy digit 9 as predicted by LeNet as 2, 4, 2, and 2 (from left to right),
after adding noise generated by Equation (8). The first image marked in
red is the noise free sample.
Fig. 5. Non-targeted Attacks with α%-pixel support on Ima-
geNet. The figure in the top row the noisy images that fool AlexNet as
generated by solving Equation (8). The second row shows the generated
noise with α = 2% of the total pixels in the image.
Non-Targeted Attacks with α%-Pixel Support. Inspired
by the findings of some recent work [12], we demonstrate
that we can construct additive noise that only corrupts α%
of the pixels in an input image, but still changes the class
prediction. Here, we use LeNet on MNIST and AlexNet on
ImageNet. In this case, we do not specify the target class
j but rather we optimize for the prediction scores of the
correct class i to be less than the maximum prediction score.
The underlying optimization is formulated as follows:
arg min
µαx ,σ
(
EMi (µαx , σ2)−max
k 6=i
(
EMk (µαx , σ2)
))
s.t. 0 < σ2 ≤ 2, − β1αn ≤ µαx ≤ β1αn.
(8)
The optimization variable µαx indicates the set of sparse
pixels (α% of the total number of pixels) in µx that will
be corrupted, while the rest of pixels are set to 0. The
locations of the corrupted pixels are randomly chosen and
fixed before solving the optimization. Two experiments are
conducted on few images, one on MNIST and the other on
ImageNet. Figures 4 and 5 show examples of noisy images
constructed by solving Equation (8) with α = 4% to fool
LeNet on MNIST and α = 2% to fool AlexNet on ImageNet.
Since there are much fewer pixels to flip the prediction of
the network and similar to the single pixel attack in [12],
we increase the permissible range of mean noise by setting
β = 550 for MNIST and β = 75 for ImageNet. Note, in these
experiments, we assume that M ∈ [0, 255]n.
Non-Targeted Attacks with Sparse and Smooth Pixel Sup-
port. In the previous section, we optimized over a randomly
selected support, α%, which may not hold any structure
nor is perceptually feasible. To that end, and towards con-
structing more meaningful structured noise that is more
perceptually feasible, we instead optimize over the complete
pixel support while enforcing both sparsity and smoothness,
in this subsection. In other words, we are interested in
designing a Gaussian distribution with, for ease, an identity
input covariance (Σx = In) but with mean µx that is both
sparse and smooth, such that samples from this distribution
cause the network to incorrectly predict the class of the
input. The optimization of interest can be formulated as
follows:
arg min
µx
‖µx‖1 + Ω(∇xµx,∇yµx)
s.t. EMi (µx, 1)−max
k 6=i
(
EMk (µx, 1)
)
≤ −γ,
(9)
where γ > 0 is some constant controlling the misclassifi-
cation confidence, Ω(x, y) =
∑
i
√
x2i + y
2
i and ∇x,∇y ∈
Rn×n are gradient operators in the x and y directions,
respectively. The `1 norm in the objective is commonly used
to encourage sparsity, while Ω(∇xµx,∇yµx) is well-known
to be the total variation regularizer, which is commonly used
in various low-level image processing tasks (e.g. denoising,
deblurring, etc.), to encourage smoothness via sparse spatial
gradients. We set γ = 0 in all experiments unless stated
otherwise. We conduct two sets of experiments one with
LeNet on the MNIST dataset and another set with a variant
of AlexNet on the Facial Emotion Recognition dataset from
Kaggle. Note that the Emotion dataset consists of 35887
frontal images of faces depicting 7 emotions, where the
best performing network on Kaggle achieves a classification
accuracy of 68%. Since the Kaggle models are not publicly
available, we choose to train a variant of AlexNet to account
for the difference in the input resolution between ImageNet
and Emotion dataset images. This AlexNet variant achieves
a comparable test accuracy of 64%. We solve (9) on both
datasets (LeNet on MNIST and AlexNet on the Emotion
dataset) with l = 3, where the points of linearization are
random images from the test set that are classified correctly
by the network. Figure 6 shows few qualitative adversarial
examples from the MNIST dataset. Since the solution to
(9), µx, can be both positive and negative, we visualize
both quantities in the third and forth columns in Figure 6.
One can observe how the sparse noise is both smooth and
structured due to the proposed total variation regularizer.
For instance, the noise that corresponds to misclassifying the
digit 3 to 9 in Figure 6 is indeed located at the top left part
of the digit perceptually altering digit 3 into looking more
like digit 9. This confirms that the proposed optimization
(9) indeed results in a Gaussian distribution, where noise
sampled from that distribution is more perceptually feasible
for the task of network misclassification. To perform tar-
geted attacks (with target class j), one can simply replace
the constraint in (9) with:
max
k 6=j
(
EMk (βµx, 1)
)
− EMj (βµx, 1) ≤ −γ. (10)
Note that obtaining a feasible solution to problem (9) with
the constraint replaced by (10) constructs a Gaussian distri-
bution, where samples from this distribution result in an ex-
pected prediction at class j be higher than all other classes.
We show in Figure 7 examples for targeted sparse smooth
attacks that fool the network into classifying the digit 4 to
the targeted classes 5, 8 and 9. In particular, it is interesting
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Fig. 6. Non-targeted attacks with sparse and smooth pixel support. We show that the solution µx to Problem (9) is indeed both sparse and
smooth. The columns from left to right are the mean image for a given class, the absolute value of µx, the decomposition into positive and negative
values, respectively and the last column shows the first column added with noise sampled from N (µx, I). After the addition of the structured noise,
the network classified the noisy images as 6, 8, 9, 9, and 9, respectively.
to observe that when the target class is digit 5 (first row
of Figure 7), the Gaussian sampled noise has negative and
positive components to the top right and top parts of digit
4, respectively, which tend to be more perceptually feasible
than the unconstrained noise case. A similar observation
can be made for the cases when the target class is digit 8
or 9. For a more detailed quantitative experiment on the
effectiveness of the proposed optimization in constructing
targeted attacks, we conduct experiments on 70 randomly
selected images from the Emotion dataset (10 per class). In
particular, we construct targeted attacks from every class
in the Emotion dataset to every other class. Table 5 reports
the confusion matrix of the misclassification rate for every
source-target pair. Note that with the proposed objective
in (9) with the constraint replaced by (10), high misclassi-
fication rates to the targeted classes are effectively achieved
with perceptually feasible attacks. This is consistent in all
source-target pairs, as summarized in Table 5. We show
several qualitative results of these attacks in the Appendix.
Misclassification Rate with Varying γ. Here, we explore
the effect of varying the parameter γ, which controls the
misclassification rate confidence of the Gaussian sampled
attacks. Larger γ should result in samples from the de-
TABLE 5
Targeted sparse Gaussian attacks. The table shows the
misclassification rate from every class to every other class by solving
(9) with the targeted attack constraint in (10) on 70 randomly selected
images from the Emotion dataset (10 per class).
Target Class
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
So
ur
ce
C
la
ss
0 - 1 0.7 1 0.7 0.9 1
1 0.8 - 1 1 0.7 0.9 1
2 1 1 - 1 0.9 1 1
3 0.9 1 0.7 - 0.7 0.7 0.9
4 1 1 1 1 - 1 0.9
5 0.9 1 0.9 1 0.6 - 1
6 0.9 1 0.8 1 1 0.9 -
signed Gaussian with a larger expected prediction output
for the target class j than all other classes. Since the highest
misclassification, as per Table 5, occurred when the source-
target pair is classes 5 and 4, respectively, we solve Problem
(9) with class 4 as the targeted class in constraint (10) for
images from class 5. We randomly select 30 images from
class 5 while varying |γ|. In Figure 8, we plot the average
misclassification rate over the 30 samples, where we show
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Fig. 7. Targeted attacks with sparse and smooth pixel support. The columns from left to right are the mean image for a given class, the absolute
value of µx, the decomposition into positive and negative values, respectively and the last column shows the first column added with noise sampled
from N (µx, I). After the addition of the structured noise, the network classified the noisy images as 5, 8, and 9, respectively.
on the x-axis the variation in the expected separation in net-
work predictions, i.e. maxk 6=j
(EMk (βµx, I)) − EMj (βµx, I).
As anticipated, we observe that the misclassification rate
increases with the increase in separation between the two
expected predictions. It is essential to note that, while larger
γ indeed results in a higher misclassification rate, it comes
at the expense of solving a harder optimization problem.
Sparsity with Varying γ. In addition to the role of γ in
increasing the misclassification rate, we study its impact on
the sparsity of the sampled noise. This is essential towards
understanding whether the attacks are resulting in a higher
misclassification rates with larger γ due to an increase in
the noise support, i.e. lower sparsity. Similar to the previous
experiment, we plot the sparsity in the noise as a func-
tion of the expected separation in network predictions, i.e.
maxk 6=j
(EMk (βµx, I))−EMj (βµx, I). To measure sparsity, all
values in the constructed noise that are ≤ 10−3 are consid-
ered to be zero. As shown in Figure 8, the sparsity starts at
around 90% and decreases only marginally. This indicates
that there exist powerful Gaussian attacks that result in
high misclassification rates, due to the large separation in
the expected predictions, which are also effectively sparse.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we extend and generalize our preliminary
results in [1], where we derive the exact second moment
expression for a small PL neural network in the form
(Affine, ReLU, Affine) under no assumptions on the input
mean of the Gaussian distribution. We conduct extensive
experiments demonstrating the role of the layer, l, at which
two-stage linearization is performed, and over strategies in
selecting the point of network linearization. Moreover, we
demonstrate that such expressions can be used to construct
targeted and non-targeted Gaussian adversarial attacks that
are both sparse and smooth (more perceptually feasible).
Fig. 8. Misclassification and sparsity rates under varying separa-
tion of expected predictions. With the increases in the separation
between the expected output predictions of the correct and incorrect
class increases, the misclassification rate increases while maintaining
the same sparsity in the Gaussian attacks.
APPENDIX
QUALITATIVE RESULTS ON THE EMOTION DATASET
The classes in the Emotion dataset are “Anger”, “Disgust”,
“Fear”, “Happiness”, “Sadness”, “Surprise” and “Neutral”.
In a similar fashion to the MNIST experiments in Figure 6,
we visualize in Figure 9 the structured noise upon solving
the total variation regularized Problem (9). Despite that en-
coding high-level semantic information, such as emotions,
in pixel intensity space is generally very difficult, some of
the presented qualitative results in Figure 9 are perceptually
aligned. For instance, in the last row, the Gaussian noise is
structured around the eyebrows resulting in misclassifying
“Neutral” as “Sadness”. A similar observation is to be
noted for the first row where the “Happiness” image is
misclassified as “Sadness” where all the noise is structured
around the eyebrows and the chin.
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Original Mask Add Subtract
From label: 0 to label: 6
Label flipped to 6
Original Mask Add Subtract
From label: 1 to label: 2
Label flipped to 2
Original Mask Add Subtract
From label: 2 to label: 6
Label flipped to 6
Original Mask Add Subtract
From label: 3 to label: 4
Label flipped to 4
Original Mask Add Subtract
From label: 4 to label: 6
Label flipped to 6
Original Mask Add Subtract
From label: 5 to label: 2
Label flipped to 2
Original Mask Add Subtract
From label: 6 to label: 4
Label flipped to 4
Fig. 9. Non-targeted attacks with sparse and smooth pixel support. We show that the solution µx to Problem (9) is indeed both sparse and
smooth and in some cases perceptually aligned on the Emotion dataset. The columns from left to right are an image from the Emotion dataset to be
optimized over from a given class, the absolute value of µx, the decomposition into positive and negative values, respectively and the last column
shows the first column added with noise sampled from N (µx, I). After the addition of the structured noise, the network misclassified the images as
as Neutral, Fear, Neutral, Sadness, Neutral, Fear and Sadness from Anger, Disgust, Fear, Happiness, Sadness, Surprise, and Neutral, respectively.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Theorem 1. For any function in the form of g(x) where x ∼
N (µx,Σx), we have:
E[gi(x)] =
p∑
v=1
B(i, v)
(
1
2
µ¯v − 1
2
µ¯verf
( −µ¯v√
2σ¯v
)
+
1√
2pi
σ¯v exp
(
− µ¯
2
v
2σ¯2v
))
+ c2(i)
where µ¯v = (Aµx + c1) (v), Σ¯ = AΣxA>, σ¯2v = Σ¯(v, v) and
erf (x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0 e
−t2dt is the error function.
Proof. Based on Remark (1) and noting that (Ax+ c1) ∼
N (µ¯, Σ¯), we have:
µ˜(i) =
∫ ∞
0
z
1√
2piσ¯i
exp
(
− (z − µ¯i)
2
2σ¯2i
)
dz
=
1
2
µ¯i − 1
2
µ¯ierf
( −µ¯i√
2σ¯i
)
+
1√
2pi
σ¯i exp
(
− µ¯
2
i
2σ¯2i
)
Thus, E[gi(x)] =
∑p
v=1B(i, v)µ˜(v) + c2(i).
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PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Lemma 1. The PDF of q2(x) = max2(x, 0) : R → R where
x ∼ N (0, σ2x) is :
fq2(x) =
1
2
δ(x) +
1
2
√
x
fx(
√
x)u(
√
x)
and its first moment is E[q2(x)] = σ
2
x
2 .
Proof. By the cumulative distribution function (CDF):
Fq2(c) = P(max2(x, 0) ≤ c) = 1
2
δ(c) + Fx(
√
c)u
(√
c
)
(11)
Fq2 and Fx are the CDFs of q2 and x. Differentiating the
smooth part of (11) with respect to c completes the proof.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Lemma 2. Let x ∈ Rn ∼ N (µx,Σx) for any even p, where
σij = Σx(i, j) ∀i 6= j. Under mild assumptions on the nonlin-
ear map Ψ : Rn → R, we have ∂
p
2 E[Ψ(x)]∏
∀oddi ∂σii+1
= E[ ∂
pΨ(x)
∂x1...∂xp
].
Proof. The proof is very similar to the one found in [30]
but with n variables and by taking gradients with respect
to consecutive covariances Σ(i, j). For ease of notation, we
will refer to
∏n
i dxi as d
nx and that
√
j = −1. First, we
define the characteristic function and the inverse Fourier
Transform of the joint Gaussian, i.e. f(x), as follows:
Φ(w) =
∫
Rn
f(x)ej
∏n
i=1 wixidnx
= e(w
>µx)j− 12
∑n
i
∑n
j wiwjΣx(i,j),
(12)
f(x) =
1
(2pi)n
∫
Rn
Φ(w)e−j
∏n
i=1 wixidnw, (13)
∂pf(x)
∂px
=
1
(2pi)n
∫
Rn
Φ(w)(−j)pe−j
∏n
i=1 wixi
p∏
i
wid
nw.
(14)
Taking the derivatives of the covariances of the consecutive
variables, i.e. ρi,i+1, we have that
∂
p
2 Φ(w)∏
∀oddi ∂ρi,i+1
=
n
2∏
∀oddi
−1
2
(2wiwi+1)Φ(w)
= (−1) p2 Φ(w)
p∏
i
wi.
(15)
By substituting Equation (13) in the expectation of the
function Ψ(x) over the joint probability density function
f(x), we have:
E[Ψ(x)] =
∫
Rn
Ψ(x)f(x)dnx
=
1
(2pi)n
∫
Rn
∫
Rn
Ψ(x)e−j
∏n
i=1 wixiΦ(w)dnwdnx.
Now by applying the theorem and substituting Equation
(15), we have:
∂
p
2E[Ψ(x)]∏
∀oddi∂ρii+1
=
1
(2pi)n
∫
Rn
∫
Rn
∂
p
2 Φ(w)∏
∀oddi∂ρii+1
e−j
∏n
i=1 wixi
Ψ(x)dnwdnx
=
1
(2pi)n
∫
Rn
∫
Rn
(−1) p2 Φ(w)
p∏
i
wi
e−j
∏n
i=1 wixiΨ(x)dnwdnx
(a)
=
∫
Rn
Ψ(x)
∂pf(x)
∂px
dnx
=
∫
Rn
∂pΨ(x)
∂px
f(x)dnx = E
[
∂pΨ(x)
∂px
]
.
Equality (a) holds since (−1) p2 = (−j)p holds for even p. As
for the last equality, it follows by integrating by parts since
the Gaussian PDF f(x) is in Schwarz class.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Lemma 3. For any bivariate Gaussian random variable x =
[x1, x2]
> ∼ N (02,Σx), the following holds for T (x1, x2) =
max(x1, 0) max(x2, 0):
E[T (x1, x2)] =
1
2pi
(
σ12 sin
−1
(
σ12
σ1σ2
)
+ σ1σ2
√
1− σ
2
12
σ21σ
2
2
)
+
σ12
4
where σij = Σx(i, j) ∀i 6= j and σ2i = Σx(i, i).
Proof. Using Lemma (2) with p = 4 and choosing σ12 to be
the covariances at which differentiation happens, we have:
∂2E[T (x1, x2)]
∂σ12∂σ12
= E
[
∂4E[T (x1, x2)]
∂x1∂x2∂x1∂x2
]
= E
[
∂4E[T (x1, x2)]
∂x21∂x
2
2
]
=
1
2piσ1σ2
√
1− σ212σ1σ2
(16)
To solve the partial differential equation in Equation (16),
two boundary conditions are needed. Similar to [25], they
can be computed when σ12 = 0, which occurs when x1 and
x2 are independent random variables. It is easy to show
from Remark 1 that E[T (x1, x2)]|σ12=0 = σ1σ22pi and that,
∂E[T (x1, x2)]
∂σ12
∣∣∣∣
σ12=0
lemma (2)
= E[u(x1)u(x2)]
σ12=0= E[u(x1)]E[u(x2)] =
1
4
With these boundary conditions, we compute the integral to
complete the proof.
E[T (x1, x2)] =
∫ σ12
0
1
4
+
∫ y
0
dc
2pi
√
1− c2
σ21σ
2
2
 dy + σ1σ2
2pi
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PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof. The proof follows naturally after considering the
much simpler scalar function that is in the form
g˜(z) =
∑d
t αtmax(zt, 0) where z ∈ Rd ∼ N (0d,Σz).
Therefore, we have E[g˜2(z)] =
∑d
r α
2
rE[max2 (zr, 0)] +
2
∑
v2≤v1 αv1αv2E[max (zv1 , 0) max (zv2 , 0)]. Note that g˜(z)
is only a special case of gi(x), where z = Ax and
αt = B(i, t). It is also clear from E[g˜ (z)] that it is sufficient
to analyze E[g˜ (z)] in the bivariate case. Thus, the function
we are interested in is E[g˜2 (z1, z2)] = α21E[max2 (z1, 0)] +
α22E[max2 (z2, 0)] + 2α1α2E[max (z1, 0) max (z2, 0)]. Using
Lemmas 1 and 3, the proof is complete.
RECOVERING LEMMA 3 AS A SPECIAL CASE
Proposition 1. Equation (1) for µ1 = µ2 = 0 recovers the result
of Lemma 3.
Proof. To see this, we first start by observing that
Ω(0, 0, σ1, σ2, ρ) =
σ1σ2
√
1−ρ2
2pi +
ρσ1σ2
4 . Note that since
Ia,b(x) =
√
pi
2
∫ x
0 exp(−t2)erf(at + b)dt, then Ia,b(0) = 0.
Therefore, we have the following:
E[max(x1, 0) max(x2, 0)] =
σ1σ2
√
1− ρ2
2pi
+
ρσ1σ2
4
+

ρσ1σ2
pi Iρ/
√
1−ρ2,0 (∞) |ρ| < 1√2 ,
ρσ1σ2
pi sign(ρ)
(
pi
4 − I√1−ρ2|ρ|/,0 (∞)
)
|ρ| > 1√
2
.
(17)
Moreover, since for the incomplete Gamma function we
have P (x,∞) = 1, then:
Ia,0(∞) =
√
pi
2
∞∑
u=0
(a/2)
2u+1
Γ(u+ 3/2)
H2u(0). (18)
This is since the odd terms in the Hermite polynomial
vanish, i.e. H2u+1(0) = 0. As for the even terms, i.e. H2u(x),
they are given as H2u(x) = (2u)!
∑u
l=0
(−1)u−l
(2l)!(u−l)! (2x)
2l.
Thus, we have that H2u(0) = (2u)!
(−1)u
u! . Note that since,
Γ(u+ 3/2) = (u+ 1/2) (2u)!4uu!
√
pi, substituting in (18), we have
the following:
Ia,0(∞) = 1
2
∞∑
u=0
(−1)u (a)2u+1
2u+ 1
=
1
2
tan−1(a). (19)
Using the identity sin−1(x) = tan−1 (x/√1−x2), Equation
(17) can be reduced to:
E[max(x1, 0) max(x2, 0)] =
σ1σ2
2pi
(
ρ sin−1(ρ) +
√
1− ρ2
)
+ ρσ1σ24 |ρ| < 1√2 ,
σ1σ2
2pi
(
ρsign(ρ)
[
pi
2 − tan−1
(√
1−ρ2/|ρ|
)]
+
√
1− ρ2
)
+ ρσ1σ24 |ρ| > 1√2 .
(20)
Note that for the case ρ > 1/√2, one can observe that
pi/2 − tan−1(
√
1−ρ2
ρ ) =
pi/2 − cos−1(ρ) = sin−1(ρ). Lastly,
when ρ < −1/√2, we have that pi/2 − tan−1
(√
1−ρ2
−ρ
)
=
pi/2 − cos−1(−ρ) = − sin−1(ρ) where sign(ρ) = −1. This
completes the proof as σ12 = ρσ1σ2 in Lemma 3.
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